Chapter 2 The Anatomy of Indian Parliamentary Elections

Introduction
In elections to India's lower house of Parliament (the Lok Sabha) a single representative for each of 543 constituencies is elected -on the basis of obtaining the largest number of votes of all the candidates contesting that constituency -as the Member for that constituency. This system of election is known as the First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) system. In this chapter we examine features of the system of elections to India's lower house of parliament (hereafter, the Lok Sabha) with respect to the size of the electorate, the percentage of voters that turned out to cast their vote, and the candidates that offer themselves to the voters' judgement. Using recently available data, we examine the consequences of voters being able, under a 2013 ruling by India's Supreme Court, to reject all available choices by availing of the option of voting for a fictional candidate, 'None of the Above' (NOTA). We also examine the electoral performance of candidates who (following a 2003 Supreme Court ruling, requiring all candidates to reveal, six months before they filed their candidacy papers, whether there were outstanding criminal charges against them) had criminal charges against them.
Before doing so, we discuss in the next two sections the twin pillars of India's electoral system: the Election Commission of India (ECI) which oversees and regulates the electoral activities of political parties with the power to proscribe any activity (or activities) it feels inappropriate to the electoral process; and the plethora of political parties which, through their candidates, seek the mandate of voters and, by doing so, subject themselves to the regulatory supervision of the ECI.
The Election Commission of India
The ECI is a body mandated under Article 324(2) of the Indian constitution and currently comprises a Chief Election Commissioner and two Commissioners.
1 Its constitutional role is the "superintendence, direction, and control of elections". Under the Representation of the People Acts of 1950 and 1951, the ECI appoints the Chief Electoral Officer in each state or Union Territory (UT), the District Election Officer for each district, and the Returning Officer for each Lok Sabha or Assembly constituency where the latter is responsible for the conduct of elections in that constituency. The ECI in consultation with the state or UT government appoints an Electoral Registration Officer who is responsible for the preparation of the electoral rolls for each constituency in that state or UT. The District Election Officer then appoints the Presiding Officer for a particular polling station who, with the assistance of Polling Officers, is responsible for voting at that station. In addition, the ECI may appoint 'observers' to a particular constituency -either with respect to the general conduct of that election or, more specifically, with respect to election expenditures -who then report directly to the ECI.
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The Electoral Commission of India (ECI) has progressively tightened its views on permissible campaigning practices through its Model Code of Conduct (MCC) . 3 At the start of an election period, this Code sets out an elaborate set of parameters within which elections should be conducted. In general, the MCC places strictures on the conduct of the election campaign by requiring that: As Singh (2012) points out, the MCC was first developed in the 1960s in the state of Kerala following a broad consensus among politicians about the need for ethical ballast to the electoral vessel. Despite the fact that it has no statutory basis, the MCC has progressed from a voluntary agreement between political parties to a set of prescriptive rules, codified and implemented by the ECI with the acquiescence (however, grudgingly given) of all the political parties involved.
In 2013, the Supreme Court directed the ECI to frame guidelines with regard to the contents of election manifestos in consultation with all the recognized political parties. Broadly, the ECI expects that manifestoes will not seek to beguile voters by containing promises which cannot be met and, indeed, which the party concerned has no intention of meeting. In particular, the ECI expects that "manifestos also reflect the rationale for the promises and broadly indicate the ways and means to meet the financial requirements for it.
The MCC also constrains the ruling party, in particular its government's ministers, from using public resources -cars, planes, helicopters, government personnel -for campaign purposes or to seek to influence voters by announcing new grants (for example, increases in pensions), new projects (like roads, hospitals, schools), or to make strategic appointments (like, university vice-chancellors or chairpersons of public bodies). Such constraints that the ECI places on the pre-election behaviour of the ruling party -and, in respect of bribing and intimidating voters, also on other parties -blunts the use of 'vote banks' for electoral purposes.
In the Indian context, Srinivas (1955) coined the term 'vote banks' to mean the exchange of benefits and favours to groups of citizens in return for their political support. Vote banks had three essential features: political parties which, at the time Srinivas was writing, was essentially the Congress party; a village 'middle man', usually a high caste landowner who was a party member and who had agency over groups of voters; and voter groups. There was then a patron-client relationship between party and 'middle man', and the middle man and voters, based on a system of reciprocal favours.
Favours to voters took essentially two forms: the provision of local public goods targeted at particular groups, say a paved road or a school in a locality in which people from a group were concentrated; the provision of private benefits to targeted groups of (usually poor) voters, often in the form of cash payments or gifts in kind like cycles, sewing machines, and illegally supplying below poverty line (BPL) cards to voters who do not qualify for these (Breeding, 2011) . This raises the interesting question, addressed by Schedler and Shaffer (2007) , of how one should distinguish between favours granted through the public purse ('local' public goods) and payments in cash and in kind. Indeed, even when direct payments are made they should not necessarily to be viewed as purely commercial transactions; instead, they may reflect a socio-cultural relationship between the patron and client, embodying 'obligation and reciprocity' and an egalitarian transfer of resources from rich to poor (Srinivas, 1955) .
However, the efficacy of vote banks as an electoral instrument has been severely blunted by the MCC in respect of its strictures on bribing and intimidating voters. An important consequence of the MCC has, therefore, been that the reliance of parties in India on vote banks to deliver electoral approval is based more on hope than on expectation since falling foul of the ECI's strictures risks severe penalties including disqualification. 4 Today in India, not least because of the efforts of the ECI, as Breeding (2011) observes, "vote banks are social displays of wealth on the part of political parties to attract, primarily low-income citizens; they are gestures, historical remnants of a system in which the rules governing the game have changed" (p.77). 
India's Political Parties
Any political party wishing to contest an election in India for a seat in a state legislative assembly or to the Lok Sabha must first register with the ECI with the advantage of registering being that the (registered) party gets preference in the matter of allotment of free symbols vis-à-vis purely independent candidates. The ECI then classifies registered parties as 'recognised' or 'unrecognised' parties with recognition being awarded as a 'national' or as a 'state' party.
In order to be recognised as a 'national' party, a party must fulfil any of the following conditions: 6 1. It wins 11 Lok Sabha seats from at least three different states.
At a Lok Sabha general election, it polls six percent of votes in four States and also wins four
Lok Sabha seats.
3. It is recognised as a 'state party' in at least four states.
In order to be recognised as a 'state' party, a party must fulfil any of the following conditions:
4 As a consequence of employing over two million workers during elections, the ECI's observers are ubiquitous and, since they are drawn from the ranks of those in civilian employment, cannot be easily identified. In addition, the Indian media seizes upon any infractions of the MCC and affords them considerable publicity. 5 Indeed, it is a moot point whether the fact that 'vote buying' is virtually unknown in Western countries is due more to the difficulty of doing so than to any innate moral superiority. Wang and Kurzman (2007) detail the planning, organization, and sheer expenditure required for a widespread vote buying in the 1993 elections in Taiwan. Vote buying required extensive network of brokers who would each control small groups of voters. In order to be effective, such a network was predicated on: detailed local knowledge; relationships of trust between party brokers and voters; a large budget; and legal circumspection in conjunction with, possibly, judicial protection. To compound these problems, 45% of voters did not deliver on their promises to vote appropriately. 6 Press Information Bureau, Election Commission of India, http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=104537 retrieved 6 November 2015.
1. It should win at least three percent of the total number of seats or a minimum of three seats in the Legislative Assembly.
2. It should win at least one seat in the Lok Sabha for every 25 seats (or fraction thereof) from that State.
3. It should obtain at least six percent of the total valid votes polled during general election to a
Lok Sabha or state Legislative Assembly and should, in addition, win at least one Lok Sabha, and two Legislative Assembly seats in that election.
4. Even if fails to win a seat to the Lok Sabha or to the state assembly, the party will still be recognised as a state party if it secures eight percent or more of the votes in that State.
As of 'unrecognised' parties.
7 Table 2 .1 shows the composition of the 16 th Lok Sabha (that is, formed after the May 2014
General Election). This shows that the status of a party -as a recognised national or state party -had little bearing on the number of seats it held in the 16 th Lok Sabha -after the BJP and INC, the next six parties with the largest number of seats were all state parties with a national party (the CPM) only appearing in seventh place. 
Electorates and Turnout
Compared to the United Kingdom, the size of the Indian electorate is enormous. In 2014, the turnout of voters was greater than 80 percent in 69 constituencies and it fell below 50 percent was in only11 constituencies. Table 2 .2 shows, for each Lok Sabha election between 1962 and 2014, the average size of the electorate, the percentage of voters who voters in these constituencies, and also inter-constituency inequality in the distribution of these sizes and turnouts. Inequality is measured by the Gini coefficient which is one of the most commonly used inequality measures. If N represents the total number of constituencies and E i and E j are the electorate sizes in constituencies i and j, the Gini coefficient is defined as:
In other words, the Gini coefficient is computed as half the mean of the difference in sizes between pairs of constituencies, divided by the average constituency size (µ Considerations of voter turnout at elections raise the question of why people bother to vote.
Traditional theories of voting are based on an individualistic model of voting. On this view of voting, it is not clear why a rational individual, on a purely cost-benefit basis, would bother to vote: the chances of an individual vote influencing the electoral outcome are infinitesimally small while the costs of voting -taking time off work, standing in a long queue -are real and not insubstantial (Downs, 1957) . However, given the far from negligible turnout witnessed in elections in India and, indeed, throughout the world, it is clear that people do take the trouble to vote.
One reason why people vote is because of 'group identity' voting which has been analysed, for elections in Israel, by Hillman et. al. (2014) . In the Indian context, the existence of vote banks go some way towards explaining why large numbers of people in India turn out to vote. Downs ' (1957) argument was based on the belief that the costs of voting -gathering information about parties and candidates, registration, time spent to/from/at the polling station -were specific to the voter and were likely to exceed the benefits from voting. The latter are in the form of collective goods and their benefit to a specific voter are likely to be zero. 10 However, in the context of 'vote banks', many of the benefits of voting may be private benefits paid to groups of voters for their electoral support and may be quite substantial.
The existence and implementation of the Model Code of Conduct, discussed earlier, is likely to have diminished the importance of an exchange of favours, between electors and candidates, that characterised traditional vote banks. However, in addition to opportunistic electoral politics, based on reciprocal favours, there are several, more general, explanations for this paradox of (not) voting. As
Geys (2006) observes, the instrumental theory of voting holds that an action has value only if it affects outcome. Sen (1977) argued that if "outcome" was narrowly defined as serving one's own interest, to the exclusion of any other's, then a person acting in such a manner might be 'rational' but he would also be a fool.
Indeed, Sen (1977) argued that people act out of a myriad motives many of which are unconnected with self-interest. One of these is 'sympathy', another is 'commitment'. Even if it is argued that 'sympathy' is just an economic externality, Sen (1977) argues that commitment involves a counter-preferential choice, destroying the crucial assumption that the chosen alternative must be better than the others -"it drives a wedge between personal choice and personal welfare" (p. 329).
Consequently, the high turnout in elections "may be guided not so much by expected utility maximisation but by something simpler, viz. just a desire to record one's true preference" (p.333).
The concept of 'expressive voting' elaborates upon, and extends, the view of people voting to record their preference. In terms of 'expressive voting', people vote not for instrumental reasonsthat is to effect change -but rather to express an opinion or a point of view, regardless of whether that turns out to be the winning opinion. This view has been articulated by inter alia Brennan and Lomasky (1993), Hillman (2010), and Hamlin and Jennings (2011).
All this is not to say that expressive voting cannot be self-interested or not result in change.
As regards the first point, Hillman (2010) argues that expressive utility, along with material utility, comprises total utility. A person's voting decision may be based simultaneously on maximising material utility (a high income person votes against higher tax and more generous welfare payments) and on maximising expressive utility (a high income person affirms his identity). As regards the second point, if a sufficient number of people express the same opinion then social and political change -sometimes dramatic -inevitably follows. The 2014 Indian election results, which led to a landslide victory for the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) under Narendra Modi, can be interpreted as an expression of the electorate's distaste for the ineffectual, dynastic government led by the Congress Party. As Banerjee (2014) argues that, "for many Indian voters, voting is not just a means to elect a government…rather the very act of voting is seen by them as meaningful, as an end in itself, that expresses the virtues of citizenship, accountability, and civility that they wish to see in ordinary life, but rarely can. " (p. 3).
Independent Candidates and 'None of the Above'
Lok Sabha elections attract a large number of candidates to most constituencies but the record must surely be held by Nalgonda in Andhra Pradesh and by Belgaum in Karnataka which, in 1996, fielded, respectively, 480 and 456 candidates. Apart from this bounty of candidates in Nalgonda and One possibility for the rise in independent candidates is not that they expect to win but that they want to undermine the vote of a party candidate. In a closely fought election (discussed in the next chapter) the presence of independent candidates can erode support sufficiently to have an appreciable impact of on the outcome. 11 Another reason for the reason for the rise in the number of independent candidates could be pique at being denied a party nomination. Since being a Lok Sabha member is a rewarding job -offering inter alia a good salary, generous pension benefits, government provided housing in the capital, and free travel across India -there is considerable competition to be adopted as a major party's candidate for a constituency ("getting a ticket", as it is termed in India).
Alas, many are called, but few are chosen. Some of those not chosen seek to exact revenge by standing against the official candidate who deprived them (unfairly, in their eyes) of their opportunity. <Table 2.5 > Although there has been a rise in the number of independent candidates over time, this has not been matched by the number of independent members of the Lok Sabha. In this election, NOTA received just over a total of 6 million votes -that is, 11 million less than the 17 million received by the collective of Independent candidates -and the three constituencies 12 Before NOTA, voters wishing to reject all the candidates were required to enter their names in a register and cast their vote on a separate paper ballot.
with the largest number of NOTA votes were: the Nilgiris (Tamil Nadu) with 46,559 votes comprising 5 percent of the total votes cast in the constituency; Nabrangpur (Orissa) with 44,408 votes comprising 4.3 percent of the total votes cast in the constituency; and Bastar (Chhattisgarh) with 38,772 votes comprising 5 percent of the total votes cast in the constituency.
The state with the largest number of NOTA votes was Uttar Pradesh (592,211 votes), followed by Tamil Nadu (582,062 votes), followed by Bihar (581,011 votes), followed by West Bengal (568,276 votes). These four states, collectively, accounted for 39 percent of the total of NOTA votes.
Candidates with Criminal Histories or Who Face Criminal Charges
In a landmark judgement in 2002, the Indian Supreme Court, mandated that, prior to an election, all candidates running for public office should file affidavits with the ECI in which they would report criminal histories or pending criminal charges for any offense punishable with imprisonment of two years or more; these affidavits were to be lodged six months before the individual filed his/her candidacy papers. et. al. (2015) . Their first conclusion was that, compared to non-CC members of the Lok Sabha, the attendance record of CC members was about 5 percent lower. There was, however, no difference in the amount of 'parliamentary activity' -raising questions and participating in debates -between CC and non-CC members of the 14 th Lok Sabha.
The Indian government operates a Member of Parliament Local Area Development (MPLAD)
Scheme under which members of the Lok Sabha can suggest -up to an amount of ₹5 crore (£0.5 million) per year -to the Collector of the district in which their constituencies lie, public works that might benefit their constituents. 17 Gehring et. al. (2015) analysed the utilisation of the MPLAD scheme by individual members of the Lok Sabha and found that CC members had a utilisation rate of monies under MPLAD that was 7 percent lower than of non-CC members. The overall conclusion must be that although CC candidates have a better chance of being elected than non-CC candidates 16 It should be cautioned that the numbers from Golding (2014) 
Concluding Remarks
This chapter set out some of the salient features of the Indian electoral landscape beginning with the regulator, in the form of the ECI, and proceeding to the candidates, both party and non-party.
The importance of the ECI in administering, managing, and controlling elections in India cannot be enforcer of rules that "safeguard the legitimacy of the political system" and suggest that the cabinet and parliament have ceded pride of place to these three regulatory institutions.
While many of the duties of the ECI are technical and administrative, the MCC provides a moral compass for the conduct of electoral politics in India. In so doing, the ECI has mutated from a referee enforcing rules agreed to by others, to a regulatory body which makes rules which others have to obey (Singh, 2012) . In assuming this role it has been aided by the Supreme Court ruling that under Article 324(2) of the Constitution, the ECI has "a reservoir of powers where the law was silent" (Singh, 2012) .
Some find the authoritarian nature of the ECI's mode of operation to be troubling. For example, Chaterjee (2006) feels that, by riding roughshod over local culture and practices, the ECI has gone too far in the direction of sanitising and cleaning politics. Yet others feel that, at critical moments, the ECI has proved toothless. After his alleged "hate speech" in Philbit constituency in 
